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While the negotiations over Cyprus’s bailout agreement have been extremely controversial,
this month also saw the EU and IMF relax the terms of their financial assistance to Portugal.
Alexandre Afonso details some of the main reasons why Portugal has been treated much
more leniently in negotiations. Despite falling short of economic targets, the country has been
praised for its determination to implement austerity policies. However the extent to which the
crisis has encouraged emigration by young Portuguese citizens may pose a future problem for
the sustainability of Portugal’s welfare state.
On March 15th, Portugal was granted more time to reduce its public def icit under the terms of  the
memorandum of  understanding signed with the EU, the ECB and the IMF in May 2011, when the country
became the third member state to be granted f inancial assistance in the context of  the Eurozone crisis.
This relaxation in the terms of  the bailout has been considered as a reward f or Portugal’s compliance
record with the adjustment programme, which included highly unpopular cuts in public sector wages,
dramatic tax hikes, and the privatisation of  major industries (airports, electricity, and the energy network).
Portugal has been consistently commended f or its determination in pursuing austerity ref orms, despite
economic f igures that have also consistently f allen short of  targets in terms of  growth, unemployment and
debt reduction. Recent f igures f rom the Ministry of  Finance show, f or instance, that €23.8 billion in cuts (14
per cent of  GDP) over three years have only reduced the def icit by €6.6 billion, partly because of  the sharp
drop in revenue that they have caused. Unemployment has reached 18 per cent (39 per cent f or youth
unemployment) in January. In spite of  this, the IMF has continued to laud the Portuguese “remarkably sturdy
social and polit ical consensus”, which also ensured a more lenient approach f rom Germany.
How can we explain this “consensus” set against the anti-austerity anger soaring across Europe? Three
f actors which set Portugal apart can be mentioned: the situation that prevailed bef ore the crisis, the policy
strategies of  the major polit ical parties, and the deeply enshrined tradit ion of  Portuguese cit izens to “vote
with their f eet”.
The f irst f actor is that Portugal did not go through a phase of  “boom and bust” like Spain, Greece or
Ireland. If  the measures of  f iscal retrenchment implemented since the bailout have been f airly brutal, the
turn to austerity has not been as sudden as in other countries: indeed, it had already started bef ore the
crisis. Similar to other peripheral countries, Portugal joined the Eurozone with an overvalued currency in
relation to its productivity levels. In the context of  f alling demand abroad due to German wage restraint and
increased competit ion f rom eastern and central Europe, its exports have been strongly penalised since the
late 1990s. As in Spain or Greece, the low interest rates allowed by EMU strengthened domestic
consumption, high levels of  private debt, and trade imbalances. However, by contrast to these countries
where economic growth was supported by real estate bubbles, the Portuguese housing market was
saturated by the end of  the 1990s, which made it f airly insensitive to low interest rates. Caught between
low export competit iveness and limited possibilit ies f or domestic expansion, Portugal went through a
decade of  anaemic growth af ter it entered the euro. According to OECD data, Portugal has been the
Eurozone country that has grown the least since 1999 (Figure 1). As a result, Portuguese governments
were already engaging in f iscal consolidation measures bef ore the crisis, particularly under the socialist
government of  José Socrates (2005-2011).
Figure 1: Eurozone Economic Growth 1999 – 2012 (1999 = 100)
Source: OECD.Stat
The second f actor is the polit ical strategy pursued by the major polit ical parties. While Greece has f aced a
situation of  polit ical instability that many have compared to Weimar Germany, the major Portuguese parties
have displayed a surprising degree of  consensus f rom the early stages of  the sovereign debt crisis.
Austerity measures, f irst carried out by the socialist minority bef ore the bailout, have been supported by
the centre-right PSD, and the socialists have at least passively supported a number of  measures of  f iscal
retrenchment pushed by the conservative PSD/CDS-PP coalit ion that came to power in June 2011. This
pattern of  compromise can be explained by the weak ideological distance between the major parties, but
also by their reluctance to assume of f ice in the context of  the adjustment programme. In essence, holding
of f ice in the shadow of  the Troika is not exactly an appealing prospect. It consists of  doing the dirty work
of  pushing through highly unpopular policies with a minimal margin of  manoeuvre, and seeking to def use
popular anger. For the PS and the PSD particularly, supporting the government while in opposition has been
an expedient way to push f orward a number of  unpopular measures without directly taking the blame f or it.
Even if  they have recently adopted a more combative stance, the socialists have f ound it dif f icult to
advocate an alternative agenda precisely because they pursued the same kind of  policies when they were in
power.
The f inal f actor is the tradit ional role of  emigration as a saf ety valve f or social problems in Portuguese
society. Albert Hirschman masterf ully wrote that there are three possible responses in the f ace of  adverse
polit ical or economic conditions: loyalty (compliance), voice (protest) or exit (retreat). While popular protest
(voice) has been increasing, as recently shown by a number of  mass demonstrations using the symbols of
the 1974 Carnation Revolution, what can also be observed is a mass strategy of  “exit” through emigration.
Recent f igures indicate that more than one million Portuguese have lef t the country since 1998, and up to
120,000 may have done so in 2011 alone. In a country of  ten million inhabitants, these are extremely large
numbers. The emigration cycle that started in the late 1990s is only matched by the one f rom the 1960s,
when emigration was of ten the only way to escape the rigid social structure maintained by the Salazar
dictatorship. In the context of  the current crisis, emigration may have helped to dampen unemployment and
possibly polit ical protest, but it also contributes to massive structural problems f or the sustainability of  the
welf are state. Those who leave f or Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Germany or elsewhere are of ten young
and well-educated, and since Portugal also has one of  the lowest f ertility ratios in Europe, potential net
contributors to the welf are state are leaving, while net benef iciaries, such as pensioners, are staying. In
this context, the biggest risk f or austerity-hit Portugal may not be a social explosion, but a slow death by
attrit ion.
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